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Carman: Federal Standing: 1976

FEDERAL STANDING: 1976
The doctrine of standing to sue in the federal courts has
undergone extensive transformation in recent years.' Decisions of
the Supreme Court from 1968 to 19732 led many to conclude that
the Court had "greatly expanded the concept of standing ' '3 and
"[had] so diluted [it] that even the most trivial interest
[would] suffice."' Three recent cases5 promulgating more rigid
criteria for standing indicate a clear retreat from the expanded
doctrine.
I.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF STANDING:

1968-1973

Limitations on standing are designed to guarantee that the
litigant has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which [a] court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'
This irreducible element of standing is derived from article III,
which limits the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies. '
Beyond this minimum constitutional requirement, the judiciary
has adopted rules of self-restraint in deciding whether to adjudicate in particular situations.8
1. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22 (1958); C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (2d ed. 1970); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Lewis, ConstitutionalRights and the Misuse of "Standing,"
14 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
2. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 839 (D.D.C. 1971),
afJ'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
4. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication, The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1382 (1973).
5. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
7. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
8. The idea that a court should not necessarily decide all article III cases and controversies before it, has sparked extensive legal commentary. Compare A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROuS BRANCH 113-27 (1962), with H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961), and Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment
on Principle and Expediency In JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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The courts have not adequately distinguished the minimum
article III requirements from restraints based on policy considerations.' Chief Justice Warren discussed the article III considerations in Flast v. Cohen:"°
In part, those words [cases and controversies] limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.
There is general agreement that article HI requires a plaintiff to
assert that he has been injured in some way." Whether that is the
only inquiry required has been a much-debated question; the
Supreme Court in Warth accepted the idea that article IH limitations on standing must be supplemented by judicial rules of selfrestraint.
The issue of standing is often analyzed through an inquiry
into the type of interest a plaintiff must possess to be able to have
his case adjudicated. Professor Davis states that the relevant
questions are:' 2
[W]hat interests deserve protection against injury, and what
should be enough to constitute an injury. Whether interests deserve legal protection depends upon whether they are sufficiently significant and whether good policy calls for protecting
them or for denying them protection.
A sufficient interest can arise from the common law, a statute,
or the Constitution.' 3 The pre-1974 liberalization of the law of
standing occurred in a suit which raised the constitutional rights
of a taxpayer 4 and in suits which challenged governmental deci9. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
10. 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
11. This has most often been labeled injury-in-fact. See, e.g., Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
12. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 468 (1970).
Professor Davis' analysis has been criticized as being more or less circular; "if the
plaintiff is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is legally protected; if he is
denied standing, his interest is not legally protected." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 13 (2d ed. 1970). See also Scott, supra note 1, at 651-52 & n.23.
13. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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sions 1'5 alleged to be illegal under relevant federal statutes.
A. Parties Claiming Injury Under Federal Statutes-Standing
in Conjunction with the Administrative ProcedureAct"
In companion cases in 1970, Association of Data Processing
5 the
Service Organizations,Inc. v. Camp'7 and Barlow v. Collins,"
Court formulated a new mode of standing analysis for cases in
which plaintiffs claim an injury under a federal statute not specifically providing a right to sue. The plaintiffs in Data Processing
were sellers of data processing services. They challenged a ruling
of the Comptroller of the Currency which enabled national banks
to provide data processing services in conjunction with other
banking services. Plaintiffs alleged competitive injury which the
Court found "no doubt" constituted "injury in fact."' 9 The Court
20
then stated that:
15. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
The effect of the decisions in these cases was to "blur the distinction between such
cases and those involving statutory review." Scott, supra note 1, at 660. An example of a
"true" statutory standing case is FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
In that case the plaintiff sought relief under an act providing for direct appeal to the court
of appeals "by any other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by
[specified decisions of the FCC]." Id. at 476-77. The statute thus contained a specific
grant of standing. Cf. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). It is unlikely that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (see note 16 infra) can be properly construed as a similar grant of statutory standing.
See Scott, supra note 1, at 658-59, 668 n.108.
16. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1971),
amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009-1009(a)(1964) states in pertinent part that:
[E]xcept to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law. . . .[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.
Numbers (1) and (2) above refer to situations where Congress, in its discretion, has
provided that certain agency action is non-reviewable. See generally Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 173 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
18. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The plaintiffs were tenant farmers, eligible for payments
under the upland cotton program, who challenged the Secretary of Agriculture's amendment of a regulation under the Soil Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g)(1971). The
statute permitted participants in the program to use government benefits as security for
cash or for advances to finance making a crop. The challenged amendment redefined
"making a crop" so as to exclude assignments "to secure the payment of the whole or any
part of a cash . . . rent for a farm." Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1970). The
petitioners claimed that the amendment caused them economic injury. Id. at 163.
19. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
20. Id. at 153.
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The question of standing. . . .concerns apart from the "case"
or "controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
After scrutinizing the legislative history of the act in question,2 '
the Court concluded that the plaintiff competitors were arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected. The Bank Service
Corporation Act"2 was clearly a relevant statute within the meaning of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and the
petitioners were "within that class of 'aggrieved' persons who,
under [5 U.S.C.] § 702, are entitled to judicial review of 'agency
action.' "23
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, concurred in the
results in Data Processing and Barlow, but was dissatisfied with
the majority's two-pronged test. Justice Brennan would have held
that injury-in-fact was the only article III requirement: 4
My view is that the inquiry in the Court's first step [injury-infact] is the only one that need be made to determine standing.
I had thought we discarded the notion of any additional requirement when we discussed standing solely in terms of its constitutional content in Flast v. Cohen. [Citation omitted.]
He added that since the Flast decision, "standing exists when the
plaintiff alleges . . . that the challenged action has caused him
injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 5
At least in regard to claims that rights under a federal statute
have been violated by agency action, the Court has accepted
Justice Brennan's view and has significantly expanded the categories of cognizable injury. In United States v. SCRAP,26 the
petitioners challenged an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which permitted a surcharge on7 certain railroad rates.
2
They claimed that the rate order would:
discourage the use of "recyclable" materials, and promote the
use of new raw materials that compete with scrap, thereby ad21. Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1971).

22. Id.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970).
Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 172.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Id. at 676.
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versely affecting the environment by encouraging unwarranted
mining, lumbering, and other extractive activities. The members of these environmental groups were allegedly forced to pay
more for finished products, and their use of forests and streams
was allegedly impaired because of unnecessary destruction of
timber ....

While recognizing the extreme difficulty posed by proof of the
claim, and in particular, by proof of the causal connection between the allegedly illegal act and the alleged injury, the Court
2
held:
[N]either the fact that the appellees claimed only a harm to
their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area, nor the fact that all those who use these resources
suffered the same harm, deprives them of standing.
In recognizing new categories of injury, the Court had not
dispensed with the requirement that the injury be concrete. In
Sierra Club v. Morton,5 the Court dismissed for lack of standing
because the plaintiff, Sierra Club, "failed to allege that it or its
members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes
...

. "0 Similarly, in a more recent case, the Court explained

3'

that:

Although the law of standing has been greatly changed in the
last 10 years, we have steadfastly adhered to the requirement
that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring
standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action ....
The Court has required the threatened or actual injury to be "real
and immediate [and not] hypothetical. ' '32 When the requirements are met, the plaintiff presents a concrete controversy.
In Data Processing, Barlow, SCRAP, and Sierra Club, the
28. Id. at 686-87.
29. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
30. Id. at 735.
31. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). In this case, an unwed mother
sought to enjoin discriminatory application of the Texas child support law and claimed
that the state had failed to enforce the law with respect to illegitimate children. In a five
to four decision, the Court dismissed for lack of standing. The majority applied the Flast
nexus test and held that the plaintiff had not made "[a] showing that her failure to secure
support payments result[ed] from the nonenforcement [of the criminal statute]." Id.
at 618. The Court noted that even if the plaintiffwere given the requested relief, "it would
result only in the jailing of the child's father." Id.
32. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
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Court opened the federal courts to plaintiffs who claimed that
some form of agency action had violated their "rights" under a
relevant federal statute. When the Court could discern a protective intent, either on the face of the statute or from its history,
the injured party had standing. Because the plaintiffs merely had
to allege injury which was arguably protected by the statute in
question, difficulties in proof of the causal relationship between
the injury and the violation of statute were left to the hearing on
33
the merits. As the Court stated in United States v.SCRAP:
Here the Court was asked to follow . . .[an] attenuated line
of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees
complained ....
• . .[However], [w]e cannot say on these pleadings that
the appellees could not prove their allegations which, if proved,
would place them squarely among those persons injured in fact
by the Commission's action, and entitled under the clear import
of Sierra Club to seek review.
Sierra Club and SCRAP, following as they did on the heels
of Barlow and Data Processing,had the additional effect of further obscuring the distinction between statutory and nonstatutory standing. Under the broader standing doctrine of these cases,
a litigant can apparently challenge any agency action which "arguably" affects his "rights" under a federal statute, even if the
federal statute does not in itself provide a cause of action. As
Professor Scott points out, one can argue that the Court has
treated section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act "as
'34
though it gave rise to a statutory review case.
B.

Taxpayer and Citizen Standing

Courts also face decisions on nonstatutory standing when a
citizen or taxpayer claims injury arising from the violation of a
constitutional prohibition. Analysis of such cases has its genesis
33. 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973).
34. Scott, supra note 1, at 668. In a traditional statutory standing case, the act which
creates the "right" affords standing by its own terms to a citizen who claims a personal
deprivation of the right. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) in which the plaintiff claimed a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a)(1971). The statute provided: "[lilt shall be unlawful to refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer. . . a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, or national origin." In 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1971), Congress specifically created
a cause of action to enforce the provisions of the Act: "The person aggrieved may . ..
commence a civil action . . . to enforce the rights granted or protected by this title."
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in Frothingham v. Mellon.15 The plaintiff in that case was a taxpayer who challenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act

of 1921.11 She claimed that appropriations under the Act would
"increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take her
property without due process of law. 37 The Court addressed itself
to whether a citizen qua taxpayer could institute a suit to have
38
the law declared unconstitutional:
[T]he interest [of a taxpayer] in the moneys of the Treasury-partly realized from taxation and partly from other
sources-is shared with millions of others; is comparatively
minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating
and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity.
* . .If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a
cause, then every taxpayer may do the same. . . .The bare
suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences,
goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached, that
a suit of this character can not be maintained.
The Court did not clearly indicate whether the decision represented a constitutional or a policy determination. 9
In Flast v. Cohen,4" the plaintiffs contended that the public
financing of religious schools under Titles I and II of the Elemen-

tary and Secondary Education Act of 196541 contravened the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. 2
Noting the confusion emanating from the Frothingham decision,
the Court decided to undertake a "fresh examination" of the

standing doctrine with regard to taxpayer suits.43

35. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
36. Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
37. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
38. Id. at 487. In a case decided together with Frothingham, the Court held that a
state, as parens patriae, "[cannot] institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the
United States from the operation of the statutes thereof." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
39. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1968). Professor Berger's studies show that
standing was not a term of art when the Constitution was written; it "apparently entered
our law via Frothingham in 1923." Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819 (1969).
40. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
41. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a et seq., 821 et seq. (Supp. 111973), amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a
et seq., 821 et seq. (1971).
42. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1968).
43. Id. at 94.
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Proceeding in a manner which was cryptic at best, the Court
first stated that the "fundamental aspect of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated" 44 but
then observed that "in ruling on standing, it is both appropriate
and necessary to look to the substantive issues. . . to determine
whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and
the claim sought to be adjudicated."4 In Flast, a taxpayer challenged an act of Congress executed pursuant to article I, section
8, the taxing and spending clause. He therefore satisfied the first
part of a two-part nexus test.4 6 The test's second part required
that the challenged law allegedly "exceeds specific constitutional
limitations. ' 4 The majority found that the establishment clause48
was a specific limitation on the taxing and spending power, and
that the taxpayer therefore had standing. 9
While not overruling Frothingham, the Court in Flast did
open the courts to certain taxpayer suits." The problems created
by the Flast test soon became apparent since "it is arguable that
all constitutional prescriptions are intended for the protection of
that class of citizens which is at any one time disadvantaged by
the failure to observe the constitutional requirement. 1' The
Court did not establish guidelines for distinguishing the constitutional provisions which are specific limitations on the taxing
and spending power from those which are not.-2 The Court also
failed to explain the relationship, if any, between the nexus test
and minimum article III limitations on the judicial power. ' As
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id. at 102.
46. Id. at 102-03. "It [would] not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure
of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." Id. at 102.
47. Id. at 102-03.
48. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....
U.S. Const. amend. I.
49. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
50. Professor Scott believes that the position of the Court in Flast was "an expedient
by a court retreating from the absolute barrier of Frothingham,but not sure of how far to
" Scott, supra note 1, at 661. See generally Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
go ....
Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 601 (1968); 82 HARV. L. REV. 224 (1968).
51. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintif,116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1968).
52. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayersand Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 604-05 (1968).
53. See Scott, supra note 1, at 661. The Court stated that the article III consideratons
were twofold: that the case be presented in an adversary context and that it be consistent
with the judiciary's role in the tripartite allocation of powers in the federal government.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
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Justice Harlan observed, the Flast nexus test represented judicial
cognizance of the problems which could arise if unrestricted taxpayer (or citizen) standing were available." In the nexus test,
Flast struck a troublesome compromise.
II.

THE COURT RETREATS

A.

United States v. Richardson
The respondent in United States v. Richardson5 5 had written
to the Government Printing Office to request all documents published in accordance with the statement and accounts clause. "
The documents he received failed to include a statement of the
expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency Act 57 permits the agency to account for expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director.""8 The respondent
alleged injury in that he was asked to accept an "incomplete" or
"fraudulent" document in violation of the provisions of the statements and accounts clause. 59
In deciding the standing issue, the Court focused its analysis
on part one of the Flastnexus test." The opinion, by Chief Justice
Burger, reasoned:"1
Although the status [respondent] rests on is that he is a taxpayer, his challenge is not addressed to the taxing or spending
power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA ....
. . .[Respondent] asks the courts to compel the Govern-

54. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 118-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan

noted that he believed such public actions were within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
as conferred by article III, but that "they strain the judicial function and press to the limit
judicial authority." Id. at 130.
55. 418 U.S. 166 (1974), rev'g Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972)
(en banc).
56. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
57. 50 U.S.C. § 403a (1971).
58. The sums made available to the [CIA] may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of
Government funds; [such funds shall be] accounted for solely on the certificate
of the Director . ...

Central
59.
60.
61.

Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1971).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169 (1974).
See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
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ment to give him information on precisely how the CIA spends
its funds. Thus there is no logical nexus between the asserted
status of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to
require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the
expenditures of that agency. [Footnote omitted.]
The allegations therefore failed to satisfy the Flasttest; the plaintiff was merely asserting "generalized grievances about the conduct of government.""
The Court then addressed itself to the decision below. The
court of appeals observed:63
Flast is concerned with adverseness and specificity of issues for
"standing," not spending per se.
• . . [T]he nexus between a taxpayer and an allegedly
unconstitutional act need not always be the appropriation and
the spending of his money for an invalid purpose. The personal
stake may come from any injury in fact. . . .A responsible and
intelligent taxpayer and citizen, of course, wants to know how
his tax money is being spent. . . .The Framers of the Constitution deemed fiscal information essential if the electorate was to
exercise any control over its representatives . . . and they mandated publication, although stated in general terms, of the Government's receipts and expenditures. Whatever the ultimate
scope and extent of that obligation, its elimination generates a
sufficient, adverse interest in a taxpayer.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the respondent was "in
danger of suffering any particular concrete injury . ...64 His
asserted injury, shared by all citizens, was merely "a generalized
grievance."6"
The Court noted the possibility that in light of the decision
62. Id., quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
63. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d. 844, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc), revd,
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
64. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
65. Id. at 176. The Court relied heavily upon, and by so doing, reaffirmed its decision
in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). In Levitt, a citizen challenged the appointment
of Justice Black to the Supreme Court. The challenge was based on art. I, § 6, cl.2 of the
Constitution:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States ...
the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time'. . .
The citizen-petitioner had only a "general interest" in the action, because he failed to
show that he "[had] sustained or [was] immediately in danger of sustaining direct
injury .... " Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
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there might be no one to challenge the purportedly illegal action.
Justice Burger believed that this circumstance in itself could be
taken to signify that the subject matter of the dispute was committed to Congress and ultimately to the political process. Justice
Burger noted that respondent's "[f]ack of standing within the
narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right
to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls.""6 While,
of course, not actually reaching the merits, the Court commented
that "[i]t is . . . open to serious question whether the Framers
of the Constitution ever imagined that general directives to the
Congress or the Executive would be subject to enforcement by an
individual citizen. 67
Justice Powell concurred in the result in an opinion which
outlined his views on standing. He expressed strong dissatisfaction with the criteria for taxpayer standing promulgated in Flast.
Echoing the view first expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent
in Flast,6 1 Justice Powell wrote that "it is impossible to see how
an inquiry about the existence of 'concrete adverseness' is furthered by an application of the Flasttest."69 Noting the doctrinal
confusion in the decisions on standing, he saw three options for
the Court:'"
It may either reaffirm pre-Flastprudential limitations on federal and citizen taxpayer standing; attempt new doctrinal departures in this area . . . or simply drop standing barriers
altogether ....
Justice Powell would opt for a policy of judicial self-restraint
which would assure the "peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis
rests."'7' He believes that a life-tenured judiciary must avoid unnecessary confrontations with the representative branches of gov72
ernment:
[We should limit the expansion of federal taxpayer and citizen
standing in the absence of specific statutory authorization to an
outer boundary drawn by the results in Flastand Baker v. Carr.
66. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
67. Id. at 178 n.11.
68. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 182 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 184.
71. Id. at 192.
72. Id. at 196, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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I think we should face up to the fact that all such suits are an
effort "to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air...
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the
allocation of power in the Federal System." Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S., at 106. The Court should explicitly reaffirm traditional
prudential barriers against such public actions. [Footnote omitted.] My reasons for this view are rooted in respect for democratic processes and in the conviction that "[tihe powers of the
federal judiciary will be adequate for the great burdens placed
upon them only if they are employed prudently. ..."
It is implicit in this viewpoint that some legitimate article III
plaintiffs who have alleged injury with sufficient concrete adverseness should be denied access to a judicial forum-a rejection
of Justice Brennan's injury-in-fact analysis. 73 Justice Powell
would also reject the Flast two-part nexus test, and would allow
the judiciary to use its discretion in applying prudential limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing.
B.

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War

In a companion case, Schlesingerv. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War,74 the Court found that the respondents 75 had no
standing to challenge the reserve officer status of Members of
Congress as a violation of the incompatibility clause. 76 The respondents' alleged injury, which resulted from the failure of the
executive branch to remove Members of Congress from reserve
positions, was that such Members were subject to the possibility
of undue influence by the executive branch which "deprives or
may deprive the individual named plaintiffs and all other citizens
and taxpayers of the United States of the faithful discharge...
of their duties as members of Congress, to which all citizens and
'77
taxpayers are entitled.
73. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
74. 418 U.S. 208 (1974), rev'g 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 833

(D.D.C. 1971).
75. The Committee and certain of its individual members had sought relief on behalf
of four classes:
(1) all persons opposed to United States involvement in Vietnam and purporting
to use lawful means . . ,to end that involvement. [The individual petitioners
sought to represent] (2) all officers and enlisted members of the Reserves who
were not Members of Congress; (3) all taxpayers . . .; and (4) all citizens of
the United States.
Id. at 211.
76. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
77. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 212 (1974),
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The district court had held that the respondents' status as
citizens gave them standing. The court had further found that the
issue had not been committed to either the executive or the legislative branches," and held, on the merits, that a commission in
the Reserves was an "office" within the meaning of the incompat9

7
ibility clause.

Addressing itself to the issue of citizen standing, the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, classified the respondents'
citizens' interests as "undifferentiated" from those of other citizens; their injury was therefore "injury in the abstract."8'
[I]t is nothing more than a matter of speculation whether the
claimed nonobservance of that clause deprives citizens of the
faithful discharge of the legislative duties of Reservists Members of Congress. And that claimed nonobservance, standing
alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all
citizens in constitutional governance, and that is an abstract
injury.
At this point the standing issue was resolved, because
"[a]bstract injury is not enough.""
The key to the Chief Justice's analysis of citizen standing is
that an injury shared by all citizens is "necessarily abstract" and
not an actual or threatened concrete injury. Concrete injury
"serves in part to cast [a dispute] in a form traditionally capable
of judicial resolution. . . . [and] adds the essential dimension
of specificity . . . by requiring that the complaining party have
suffered a particular injury . .
It is that injury upon which
"..,

standing may be predicated. The Court outlined three functions
which are served by the requirement: assuring that the party has
the personal stake which results in adequate presentation of the
quoting Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 46.
78. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 842 (D.D.C. 1971).
This is the inquiry a court must make when determining whether it is presented with a
nonjusticiable political question. See note 149 infra.
79. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 837-38 (D.D.C.
1971).
80. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
81. Id. at 219, quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). In O'Shea, 17
black and 2 white residents of Cairo, Illinois, claimed that that city's bail, sentencing, and
jury fee practices were executed in a discriminatory manner, in violation of the petitioners'
first, sixth, eight, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendment rights and in violation of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 (1971). The Court dismissed for lack of standing because
"[nlone of the named plaintiffs [was] identified as himself having suffered any injury
in the manner specified." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).
82. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974).
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grievance,8 ' guaranteeing that there is a real need for judicial
review and insuring that the relief framed is no broader than that
required by the facts.8" The result is that unless any one citizen
can in some way individualize the injury he suffers as a result of
an unconstitutional action, no citizen has standing to adjudicate
its constitutionality. 5
The Court proceeded to answer several arguments which the
district court had accepted in support of standing. One of these
was that although the alleged injury was "hypothetical," the incompatibility clause was "designed to prohibit such potential for
injury" " in that it was aimed at protecting precisely the citizens'
interest asserted. The Supreme Court found that such a conclusion failed to compensate for the lack of concrete injury and was
a "premature evaluation of the merits of respondents' complaint
[footnote omitted]." 8 Another argument accepted below was
that because the incompatibility clause is "precise [and] selfoperative," 8 the grievance was not a generalized one. Again, the
Court found such characterization to be an inadequate substitute
for cognizable injury and to be impermissibly based upon "preliminary appraisal of the merits."89
Finally, the Court rejected an argument that standing could
be predicated upon "the fact that the adverse parties sharply
conflicted in their interests . . . and were supported by able
briefs and arguments."9' The Court distinguished this from the
"actual injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus litigation efforts and judicial decisionmaking."' In addition, the
Court stated that evaluation of the merits, or in this instance of
the quality of the presentation of the merits, must not precede
resolution of the standing issue.9 2 In what must therefore be con83. Id. at 221.
84. Id. at 222. The framing of narrow relief is of special importance in a case such as
Schlesinger, in which the relief sought produces a conflict with one of the coordinate
branches of government. In this regard, the Court suggested that prudence requires avoiding an arguable charge of "government by injunction." Id.
85. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
86. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971).
87. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224-25 (1974).
88. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971).
89. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 (1974).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 226.
92. Id. The Court briefly alluded to the difficulties which might arise if the cognizable
injury requirement were not made the threshold issue in standing, or if a court were
permitted to consider the merits prior to the resolution of the standing question for any
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sidered dictum, the Court criticized the district court's premature determination of the merits, and in so doing, reiterated the
principle that a citizen's generalized interest in an issue cannot
93
be a basis for standing.
All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of each branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all.
Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial resolution.
The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.
• . . Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one will have standing, is not
a reason to find standing.
Turning to what it characterized as "a different question,"
the Court agreed with that part of the district court's holding
which had found no taxpayer standing. The respondents had
failed to satisfy the Flast nexus test because they were not challenging a congressional enactment under article I, section 8.11
C.

Warth v. Seldin
The most significant broadening of the requirements for fed9 5 In that
eral standing occurred in the case of Warth v. Seldin.
purpose other than the limited view required by the Flast nexus test in taxpayer suits:
"A logical corollary to [that] approach would be the manifestly untenable view that the
inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for denying
standing." Id.
93. Id. at 226-27. Chief Justice Burger stated that enforcement of the incompatibility
clause is one of those "crucial decisions [left] to the political processes." Id. at 227. To
reach this conclusion, however, he had to look to the merits of the plaintiff's case for a
purpose other than the permissible one of making a limited inquiry for determination of
taxpayer standing under the Flast nexus test. See id. at 225 n.15. Chief Justice Burger
employed the same mode of analysis as the district court-a limited examination of the
merits-and simply arrived at the opposite conclusion. The district court had concluded
that the incompatibility clause was "self-operative" and was addressed "to the potential
for undue influence rather than to its realization." Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v.
Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971). Chief Justice Burger disagreed, and concluded
that enforcement of the clause was a function of the "political processes." Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974). While Chief Justice Burger
stated that "there was no occasion [for either of the lower courts] to reach or evaluate
what [it] saw as the merits," id. at 225 n.15, he saw fit to reach the merits for a limited
purpose. This was a product of the Court's blurring of the distinctions between the standing and political question considerations. See note 149 infra.
94. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974).
95. 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), aff'g 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
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case, several groups of plaintiffs" claimed that the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York, a suburb of Rochester,9 7
by its terms and as enforced by the defendant [Zoning, Planning, and Town] [B]oard members . . . effectively excluded
persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in
contravention of petitioners' First, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
and 1983.
The plaintiffs asserted that the zoning ordinance had both "the
purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income from residence in the town."' ' In a five to four decision, the
Court, per Justice Powell, affirmed the dismissal of each plaintiff
group for want of standing.
Before addressing the facts of the case, the Court attempted
to outline the principles which would guide its standing analysis.9 The initial focus was on "whether a plaintiff ha[d] made
out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant
within the meaning of Art. III.'"I A federal court has jurisdiction
only "when the plaintiff himself has suffered 'some threatened or
actual injury [as a result of the defendant's actions].' "'", This
inquiry seeks to resolve whether the plaintiff has met the mini02
mum constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact.
The constitutionally mandated inquiry into whether the
plaintiff has suffered some threatened or actual injury is not,
however, the only stage in the resolution of a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. The Court explained two of the "prudential
limitations"' 13 on standing: (1) "when the asserted harm is a 'gen96. The five petitioner groups were: (1) low- and moderate-income Rochester resi-

dents, some of whom were members of minority groups, who claimed to have attempted
and to be presently attempting to reside in Penfield; (2) Rochester taxpayers who claimed
that they had paid increased taxes as a result of the Penfield ordinance; (3) Metro-Act of
Rochester, a not-for-profit corporation organized to alleviate the housing shortage for lowand moderate-income persons in the Rochester area; (4) Rochester Home Builders Association, which represented several construction firms in the Rochester area and had attempted to intervene as a party-plaintiff; and (5) Monroe County Housing Council, a notfor-profit corporation consisting of organizations concerned with the housing problem
which had unsuccessfully sought to be added as a party-plaintiff. The petitioner associations sought to represent their individual members as well. Id. at 2202-04.
97. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1975).

98. Id. at 2203.
99. Id. at 2205-07.
100. Id. at 2205.

101. Id. at 2205, quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
102. Id. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.

103. For a more complete discussion of Justice Powell's view of the role of prudential
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eralized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not
warrant exercise of jurisdiction";'"' and (2) "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."'' 5 These two limitations, "closely related to Article HI concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance,"'0 0 are
necessary to prevent a court from having to decide "abstract
questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary
to protect individual rights."1' 7 Another relevant factor in the
Court's standing analysis would be the source of the plaintiff's
claim, that is, "whether the constitutional or statutory provision
on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."'' 0
The Court made the following statement on the procedural
aspects of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing:19
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party. [Citations omitted.] At the same time, it is within the trial court's power to
limitations on standing see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180-97 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
104. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). As examples of this prudential
limitation, the Court cited Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Ex parteLevitt, 302 U.S.
633 (1937).
105. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). The Court cited Tilleston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) as an example.
106. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975).
107. Id. at 2206.

108. Id. But see C.

WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

43 (2d ed. 1970).

109. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2206-07. A motion to dismiss for lack of standing
was granted in Warth. There was some question of whether the submission of affidavits
and documents converted the motion to dismiss into a rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Justice Brennan explained that it did not because: (1)
the portion of rule 12(b) concerning conversion of a 12(b) motion to one for summary
judgment applies only to 12(b) (6) motions; and (2) the respondents, who filed no counteraffidavits, had not disproven the allegations. Id. at 2219 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
When a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is premised on failure to meet the case or
controversy prerequisites of article IH, it is a rule 12(b) (1) motion alleging lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1542 (1971). Presumably, rule 12(b) (1) also includes motions for a
dismissal of the case on the basis of one of the prudential limitations on standing.
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allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the
complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of
fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing. If, after this opportunity, the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear
from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed.
The Court then proceeded to decide the standing of each
petitioner group in turn, beginning its discussion with the lowand moderate-income minority group plaintiffs:""
We must assume, taking the allegations of the complaint as
true, that Penfield's zoning ordinance and the pattern of enforcement by respondent officials have had the purpose and
effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income, many
of whom are members of racial or ethnic minority groups. We
also assume, for purposes here, that such intentional ex/clusionary practices, if proved in a proper case, would be adjudged
violative of the constitutional and statutory rights of the persons
excluded.
The Court summarized the detailed allegations that these plaintiffs had not only expressed a desire to reside in Penfield, but had
made concrete attempts to find housing there."' The majority
concluded, nevertheless, that there was no concretely demonstrable causal connection between Penfield's allegedly illegal zoning
practices and the inability of these plaintiffs to procure housing.
It was "doubtful" whether these particular litigants could have
resided in the contemplated housing projects described in the
record." 2 The economics of the area housing market (petitioners'
individual financial situations and housing needs) may have been
responsible for their inability to reside in Penfield. The Court
noted that:"'
[Pletitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could
be inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would have
110. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2207 (1975) (emphasis added). The implication
of this statement is either that these plaintiffs were not members of the affected class or
that, for some other reason, this was not a "proper" case for the Court to hear.

111. Id.at 2207.
112. Id. at 2209 n.16. The Court here agreed with the opinion of the court of appeals

which stated that only the "concrete possibility of obtaining new and better housing gives
potential residents a personal stake in the outcome." Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187, 1192
(2d Cir. 1974). But see Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1213
(8th Cir. 1972); English v. Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
113. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2208 (1975).
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been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court
affords the relief requested, the asserted inability . . . will be
removed. [Citation omitted.]
Finding that the petitioners had not proven such a "substantial
probability," the Court dismissed their case.
In making its determination, the Court relied in part upon
the petitioners' claim that builders and developers who sought to
construct low-income housing projects had been denied permits
to do so. That the harm to the petitioners was caused indirectly
"[did] not necessarily deprive" them of standing, but the Court
stated:"'
[I]t may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. HI: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or
that prospective relief will remove the harm.
The Court distinguished decisions in several of the courts of
appeals which had found standing for low-income plaintiffs
challenging exclusionary zoning laws."' The earlier cases were
challenges of zoning restrictions "as applied to particular projects
that would supply housing within [the plaintiffs'] means, and of
which they were intended residents."' 6 Rather than assert that
they had been disadvantaged by the denial of a permit to a particular project, the plaintiffs in Warth "[relied] on little more
than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of
fact, that their situation might have been better had respondents
acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to afford relief."" 7
In sum, to allege "demonstrable, particularized injury"
caused by exclusionary zoning practices, a plaintiff "must allege
specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangi114. Id. (emphasis added). A similar analysis in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669 (1973), would have required that the plaintiffs show, at the pleading stage, that an
allegedly illegal 2.5 percent railroad surcharge would, in fact, have caused "unnecessary
destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials ....
Id. at 676; see note 33 supra
and accompanying text.
115. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2209 (1975), distinguishingPark View Heights
Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972), and Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1971).
116. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2209 (1975).
117. Id. at 2210.
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ble way from the courts' intervention [footnote omitted]." ' '
Demonstrations of both the harm and the anticipated benefit are
necessary before a court can be confident that there is a real need
for judicial review and that relief can be framed with the requisite
specificity." 9
The Court next addressed the issue of whether the Rochester
taxpayers had standing to sue. The taxpayers claimed that as a
result of Penfield's exclusionary ordinance, low- and moderateincome groups who would otherwise reside in Penfield were living
in Rochester. It was asserted that Rochester taxpayers therefore
had to pay higher taxes to finance more public services and lowand moderate-income housing as a result of Penfield's exclusionary policies.'20 The Court declined to recognize such a claim because: (1) the pleadings were too conjectural; (2) the line of causation between the defendants' actions and the injury was not
apparent; and (3) the taxpayers could not assert any personal
right under a statute or the Constitution to be free from the
"incidental adverse effect" of a neighboring municipality's zon21
ing law.' '
In the final section of his opinion, Justice Powell addressed
the petitioner associations' standing to sue. An association can
have standing to sue either in its own right or as the representative of its members. 12 The association, however, must allege concrete injury, either to itself or to a member or members.
Metro-Act of Rochester claimed representational standing on
behalf of low- and moderate-income minority members, taxpaying Rochester members, and members who were already residents
of Penfield. Claims to standing for the former two groups were
precluded by the holdings as to the individual petitioners.'23 The
third group, comprising nine percent of Metro-Act's members,
claimed to have suffered injury as a result of the exclusionary
zoning practices of the Penfield Boards. They were "deprived of
the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated com118. Id. (emphasis in original). But cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 620

(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
119. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2210 (1975). The Court cited Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974), for these functions of the
particularized injury requirement.

120.
121.
122.
U.S. 246
123.

Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2210 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 2211. See, e.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372
(1963) (per curiam).
See notes 110-21 supra and accompanying text.
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munity."' 14 Petitioners argued that a similar complaint had been
found to constitute injury-in-fact in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. ' The Court held that Trafficante was not
controlling because "Metro-Act does not assert on behalf of its
members any right of action under the 1968 Civil Rights Act, nor
can the complaint fairly be read to make out any such claim
[footnote omitted]." ' 6 Petitioners' complaint alleged that the
exclusionary zoning ordinance had the purpose and effect of
"[excluding] persons of low and moderate income .. ..
The
Court evidently reasoned that such a complaint, if proven, would
evidence only a financially discriminatory zoning ordinance. The
sections of the 1968 Civil Rights Act in issue were addressed, not
to financial discrimination, but to discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin. The exclusion of racial or ethnic
minorities as an incidental effect of financial discrimination was
not sufficient to bring the petitioners within the ambit of the
statute. The Court emphasized that the petitioners' complaint
did not allege a purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination."'
The Rochester Home Builders Association sought money
damages in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief. It
claimed that some of its members had lost "substantial business
opportunies and profits" as a result of the Penfield zoning prac"' Addressing the claim for monetary relief, the Court noted
tices. 29
that Home Builders neither claimed any financial damage to itself, nor an assignment of the damages claims of its members.
30
This was a fatal defect:
'.

124. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2212 (1975).
125. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante, the petitioners were tenants of Parkmerced,
an apartment complex in San Francisco. They instituted a suit in the district court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d)(1972), and claimed a violation of their rights under the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1971). See note 34 supra.
The petitioners claimed three specific injuries:
(1) they had lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community; (2)
they had missed business and professional advantages which would have accrued had they lived with members of minority groups; [and] (3) they had
suffered embarrassment and economic damages in social, business, and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents of a "white ghetto."
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). The Court held that
the definition of "person aggrieved" under section 3610 was sufficiently broad to give the
petitioners standing. Id. at 208-12.
126. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2212 (1975).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2212-13 & n.22. But cf. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974).
129. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2213 (1975).
130. Id. at 2214.
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[T]he damages claims are not common to the entire membership, nor shared by all in equal degree. . . . [W]hatever injury
may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member
concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would require
individualized proof. Thus, to obtain relief in damages, each
member of Home Builders who claims inj*ury as a result of respondents' practices must be a party to the suit, and Home
Builders has no standing to claim damages on his behalf.
While it could be assumed that the benefits of prospective relief
would inure to the members who were actually injured, that claim
failed as well because Home Builders had not averred that any
of its members had applied for a building permit or variance for
a "current" project.' 3 ' The issue was not ripe for decision.
Finally, the Court considered the claim of the Housing Council of the Monroe County Area. The Housing Council alleged that
17 of its member groups were involved in developing the Penfield
area. Only the Penfield Better Homes Corporation, however, had
made a concrete attempt to build in the Penfield area. In 1969,
the Zoning Board had rejected its application for a zoning variance. The Court emphasized that the complaint did not allege
that this project was still viable in 1972. "It is . . . possible that
in 1969, or within a reasonable time thereafter, Better Homes
itself and possibly Housing Council as its representative would
have had standing ....
"I32 "[H]owever vigorous it may once
have been," by the time the complaint was filed, it was no longer,
' 33
in the Court's estimate, "a live, concrete dispute.'

Ill.

A

CRITIQUE

The effect of Richardson, Schlesinger and Warth will be to
significantly restrict access to the federal court system.' 34 The
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2215. But see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1579 (9th ed. 1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV.
373 (1974).
134. Richardson, for example, held that the plaintiff had asserted merely a "generalized grievance [whose] impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all
members of the public.'" United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974),
quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937), and Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13
(1972). The impact of the allegedly illegal spending on the plaintiff in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968), can be characterized by almost identical language. The injury to the
plaintiff in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was also shared by members of the public
generally. Justice Powell recognized the obvious parallels and would limit taxpayer standing "to an outer boundary drawn by the results in Flastand Baker v. Carr." United States
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Court's analyses of the standing issues foreshadow an era of a
more limited judicial role in the resolution of complex social is35
sues.
A.

Flast, Richardson, and ConstitutionalRights

The difficulties in the use of the nexus test were anticipated
by Justices Douglas 136 and Harlan 3 1 in their opinions in Flast.
Several of the weaknesses of the Flast test were evident upon
examination of its use in the Richardson decision. The Court in
Flast discussed the nexus requirement in the limited context of a
suit brought by a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal taxing and spending program. 3 The plaintiff in
Richardson, however, was not directly challenging a federal
spending program. 3 9 His claim was that an executive agency
failed to publish information as required by the Constitution. As
Justice Brennan stated in dissent,4 0
[the plaintiff] alleged that the [constitutional] violations
caused him injury not only in respect of his right as a citizen to
know how Congress was spending the public fisc, but also in
respect of his right as a voter to receive information to aid his
decision how and for whom to vote.
The majority was correct in concluding that the plaintiff had not
satisfied the nexus test as developed in its application to taxpayer
status. This was not, however, the relevant inquiry, which is
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
To do so, he would distinguish Baker as "a necessary response to the manifest distortion
of democratic principles practiced by malapportioned legislatures" and Flast as "a reaction to what appeared at the time as an immutable political logjam that included unsuccessful efforts to confer specific statutory grants of standing. [Citations omitted]." Id.
at 195 n.17. Justice Powell could undertake this analysis because he was of the opinion
that the decision in Richardson resulted from a prudential limitation. One could have,
however, used Justice Powell's analysis to find standing in Richardson if the issue were
labeled as a constitutional abuse jointly created by the executive and legislative departments. Because the majority's decision was based upon article I, they were unable to
make such an inquiry. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
135. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
136. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107-14 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 118-33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 101-02. See also Scott, supra note 1, at 660.
139. In his complaint, respondent had stated that he was "a member of the electorate, and a loyal citizen of the United States." United States v. Richardson. 418 U.S. 166,
167 n.1 (1974). The petition for certiorari, however, phrased the issue as one of taxpayer
standing. Id.
140. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 236 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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whether the plaintiff had the "[sufficient] personal stake and
interest that impart the necessary concrete adverseness to
[conform to] the constitutional limitations of Article III."'' The
Court had acknowledged that the plaintiff was not challenging
taxing and spending; its use of the test developed in Flast was
inappropriate.
The final section of the Richardson opinion was addressed to
the court of appeals' position that the nexus between a taxpayer
and an allegedly unconstitutional act "need not always be the
appropriation and the spending of his money for an invalid purpose."'' The court of appeals noted that the statement and accounts clause was designed to secure the availability of fiscal
information to the public-at-large. Because the alleged injury resulted from nonobservance of this clause, plaintiff's allegations
were sufficient to give him standing "consistent with article
III."' The Supreme Court rejected this position and concluded
that the plaintiff was merely asserting "a generalized grievance."'' The plaintiff had, however, distinguished himself from
the public-at-large; he had written to request the documents published in compliance with the statements and accounts clause
and therefore had done everything possible to have the clause
executed with respect to himself. It was asserted that he had
personalized the lawsuit.145 The Court quickly dismissed this argument while acknowledging that it was likely that no one would
be able to litigate the issue. In the majority's view, this created
no problem because "Congress has plenary power to exact any
reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public
interest."'4 6 The petitioner's alternative to judicial enforcement of
141. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). The court of appeals had stated that
"Flast is concerned with adverseness and specificity of issues for 'standing,' not spending
per se." Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 852 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (footnotes
omitted).
142. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
143. Id. at 853-54. The court believed that the statement and accounts clause was
"for the benefit and education of the public," id. at 851, and that a duty was owed
"specifically to the appellant." Id. at 850.
144. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 (1974).
145. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 178 n.11. There is a serious question about the degree of discretion Congress has in executing its reporting and accounting duty. While the framers acknowledged
the possible need for secrecy in some matters, the debates on the clause were characterized
by George Mason's statement that "[t]he people . . . had a right to know the expenditures of their money. . . ." 3 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 459 (2d
ed. 1836). Accordingly, "[tihe beneficiary-as is abundantly clear from the constitutional history-is the public." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 201 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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the constitutional provision was to elect representatives who
would enforce more liberal disclosure provisions under the clause.
This means that since the citizen-litigant cannot have an adjudication of his claim on the merits, Congress is able and tacitly
encouraged to ignore the clause.
Does the Court's opinion in Richardson render the statements and accounts clause a nullity? The clause does not create
a judicially cognizable right. 147 The Court is apparently willing to
let Congress define its meaning. From an historical point of view,
this runs counter to the proposition put forward by Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist:"'
[TIhe courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order

. . .

to keep the

latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular
act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen
to be an irreconcilable variance between the two

. . .

the Con-

stitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of
the people to the intention of their agents.
Plaintiff lacked standing for two reasons: his claim failed to satisfy the nexus test and he was asserting a generalized grievance.
While reasserting that standing focuses on the party, and not
directly on the issues involved, the Court suggested that the "subject matter [of the suit was] committed to the surveillance of
"9
4...
According to the Court, the statement and
Congress .
147. As Professor Corbin wrote: "In the whole field of law there is no right without a
remedy. The reason that this statement is true is that the only useful test as to the
existence of a right is that some legal remedy is provided." 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 990
(2d ed. 1964).
148. THE FEDERALST No. 78, at 101 (E. Bourne ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton). Perhaps the
Court's answer to this would be that they have interpreted the Constitution and have
construed the subject matter of the suit to be committed to the surveillance of Congress.
149. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). This section of the opinion suggests that the Court may have viewed the issue as a political question. The inquiry
most often made to determine whether a case raises a political question has been stated
to be whether "[there is] found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department .... " Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962). See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 1, 30 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969). If the statement and accounts clause is a
general directive to Congress, then it may not be enforced by the judicial branch. This
was apparently not the intention of the founding fathers. See note 146 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 5

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

accounts clause was not intended to create a cause of action for
an aggrieved citizen. The Court clearly rejected Professor Jaffe's
view that such clauses of the Constitution are in part "intended
for the protection of that class of citizens which is disadvantaged
'50
by the failure to observe the constitutional requirement."'
B. Asserting Rights Common to Many-Are They Always
Generalized Grievances?
In Schlesinger, the Court held that the plaintiffs' asserted
injury was undifferentiated from that suffered by all citizens and
therefore inherently abstract.15' The Court stated that the
claimed nonobservance of the constitutional proscription contained in the incompatibility clause "would adversely affect only
the generalized interest of all citizens."'5 2 The Court stated no
reliable criteria for differentiating the individualized injury from
53
the generalized, the concrete one from the abstract.
Without established criteria, the courts are left to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether a plaintiff's interest is generalized or specific. The position taken in Richardson and
Schlesinger-thatif a plaintiff shares his interest with taxpayers
or citizens generally, he will not have standing-is a clear departure from the principles established in United States v.
SCRAP. 5 ' In SCRAP, the Government argued that the plaintiffs
Obfuscation of the distinction between whether a party has standing to sue and
whether the claim he asserts raises a political question is one of the major problems in
this area of constitutional law. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 450, 469 (1970); Scott, supra note 1, at 646. Chief Justice Warren stated that the
"cases and controversies" language of article I "limit[s] the business of federal courts"
to cases where litigants have standing and are not asserting a political question. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Perhaps there is no distinction in some cases between a
dismissal for lack of standing and a dismissal because an issue involves a political question-in neither case does the Court address the merits. Muddling the distinction between
these two concepts, however, only leads to results in the law being "needlessly complex
and needlessly artificial." 3 K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 22.18 (1958).
150. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-HohfeldianorIdeological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1968).
151. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
152. Id.
153. One method of ascertaining whether a taxpayer's particular interest is concrete
is the nexus test. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). Inherent in the nexus test is
the premise that a taxpayer's interest will vary according to the constitutional provision
upon which he is basing his claim. Id. at 124 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The nexus test,
however, is of little assistance in determining whether a litigant is asserting a concrete
claim or an abstract one. See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 601, 604-08 (1968); Scott, supra note 1, at 660-62 (1973).
154. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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were aggrieved, if at all, in the same manner in which all citizens
were aggrieved by the purportedly illegal action. The Court
rejected this theory: 55
[The focus of the standing analysis is] that the party seeking
review be himself among the injured, for it is this requirement
that gives a litigant a direct stake in the controversy ...
. , . Rather than a limited group of persons who used a
picturesque valley in California, all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed who breathe its air,
could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental
groups here. But we have already made it clear that standing is
not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury. . . . To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured
simply because many others are also injured, would mean that
the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.
It now appears that the Court has accepted precisely that
conclusion. The petitioner in Richardson claimed that the document published by the executive branch in compliance with the
statement and accounts clause was incomplete and therefore
fraudulent. Similarly, the litigant in Schlesinger claimed that
Congressmen who held reserve positions were subject to undue
influence by the executive branch. Since the duty to comply with
these clauses was owed to the public generally, the Court found
no particularized injury. Followed to its logical conclusion, nobody could challenge noncompliance with the clauses-the very
type of result rejected in SCRAP.
These recent decisions raise serious questions about accountability which are illustrated by the following hypothetical case.
Assume that Congress were to pass a law creating a nondisclosure
provision analogous to that in the CIA Act but applicable to the
Federal Trade Commission, or the Civil Aeronautics Board, or for
that matter, virtually any executive agency. The Freedom of Information Act would offer no recourse, because that law "does not
apply to matters . . . (3) specifically exempted from disclosure
by statute." ' 6 After Richardson, would anyone have standing to
challenge a largely blank document published in compliance with
the statement and accounts clause? According to the Court, any
one citizen's or taxpayer's interest would be "held in common by
155. Id. at 687-88 (emphasis added).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1971).
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all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract
nature of the injury all citizens share."'57 A logical nexus to taxpayer or citizen status could not be established.
The mere fact that the injury asserted by a citizen or taxpayer is shared by many other members of the public should not
necessitate characterization of his claim as a generalized grievance. If injury is asserted and the complaint thereby framed in
an adversary context, the suit should not be dismissed for lack of
standing.' 8 That a plaintiff has a poor chance of success on the
merits is irrelevant to the standing issue. The key should be
whether the litigant has asserted an injury to himself-not
whether others similarly situated suffered the same injury.
Because the taxpayer and citizen plaintiffs in Richardson
and Schlesinger had asserted only "generalized grievances"
which caused only "injury in the abstract," they did not satisfy
minimum article III requirements for standing.'59 The Court was
then faced with distinguishing these litigants from the plaintiff
in Baker v. Carr."' Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]he injury
asserted in Baker was.

. .

a concrete injury to fundamental vot-

ing rights, as distinguished from the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by respondents as citizens."''
This might be interpreted to mean that a citizen's common, undifferentiated claims under the Bill of Rights will be heard by the
courts, while injury arising from violations of other constitutional
clauses will not be heard. If this is what Chief Justice Burger
meant, it would be impossible to distinguish the majority's view
(a litigant who asserts injury based on the violation of a fundamental right will have standing, while a plaintiff who claims injury based on the violation of a right found outside the Bill of
Rights will not) from that advanced by Justice Powell. 6 ' Both
would be stating that article III minimum standards are not sufficient to screen the number of cases which the courts will hear and
that some additional criteria are needed to limit standing.
C. Examination of Causation as a Standing Issue
As noted above,'63 the standing issue purportedly focuses on
157. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
158. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
159. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-79 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-23 (1974).
160. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 (1974).
162. See note 134 supra.
163. See text at notes 6 & 44 supra.
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the party who alleges an injury and upon whether he has such a
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant the
invocation of federal jurisdiction. In Warth, the Court resolved
this issue for several plaintiff groups.
The Court stated that it must assume the plaintiffs' allegations to be true-that is, that the zoning ordinance had both the
purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income, many of whom were members of minority groups.164 The
low-income plaintiffs had in fact tried to purchase housing in
Penfield. 65' The Court imposed an extremely heavy burden of
proving concrete injury by requiring that these plaintiffs allege
"facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the
respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial
probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease
in Penfield ... ."66 The Court held that the low- and moderateincome plaintiffs had not shown in fact a relationship between
their inability to reside in Penfield and the allegedly illegal zoning law or practices. These petitioners had, however, claimed that
because of allegedly illegal actions, they had suffered harm. This
was precisely what past cases had required.
In their pleadings, petitioners arguably demonstrated that
there was a direct relationship between their injury and the claim
they sought to have adjudicated. Because of this showing, the
majority's reliance'67 on Linda R. S. v. RichardD.'68 was inappropriate. The basis of the decision in Linda R. S. was that the
plaintiff "had made no showing that her failure to secure support
payments result[ed] from the [allegedly unconstitutional
' ' The low- and moderate-income
law]. "19
plaintiffs in Warth filed
numerous affidavits which showed the relationship between their
inability to reside in Penfield and the challenged laws and practices. Thus, in Warth, the Court extended the rationale of Linda
R. S., in which the plaintiff had made no showing of a causal
relationship, to a case where the litigants submitted numerous
and extensive affidavits at the pleading stage to demonstrate the
direct relationship required. This result is inconsistent with the
concept that the "purpose of pleadings is to facilitate a proper
164% Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2207 (1975).
165. Id. at 2207 n.14.
166. Id. at 2208.
167. Id. at 2205, 2208.
168. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
169. Id. at 618.
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In short, the dismissal for lack of stand-

ing creates the anomaly pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissent:
plaintiffs "will not be permitted to prove what they have alleged-that they could and would build and live in [Penfield] if
changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its application-because they have not succeeded in breaching. . . the very
barriers which are the subject of the suit."' ' 7' In Linda R. S., the

Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to make any showing that she would be aided by an adjudication by the Court. The
low- and moderate-income plaintiffs did allege that they could
and would live in Penfield, absent the restrictive zoning laws. To
demand a greater showing is to come close to the extreme of
requiring a plaintiff to prove his entire case at the pleading stage.
The "but for" analysis-demonstration on the pleadings that
but for the defendant's allegedly illegal actions, plaintiff would
not have been injured-is in sharp contrast to the Court's previous treatment of the issue. In United States v. SCRAP, the
72
Court reasoned:

Here, the Court was asked to follow

. .

. [an] attenuated line

of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees complained-a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased
use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable
goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources
to produce such goods, some of which might be taken from the
Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be
discarded in national parks in the Washington area.
.. . [W]e deal here simply with the pleadings in which the
appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural
resources that were claimed to be affected.
The line of causation which the Court followed in SCRAP was far
more attenuated than that alleged in the pleadings in Warth. The
Court reasoned that it should hear the case in SCRAP because
"[w]e cannot say on these pleadings that the appellees could not
prove their allegations which, if proved, would entitle them to
seek review."'7 3
How could the petitioners demonstrate at the pleading stage
that the allegedly illegal ordinance was the cause of their inability
170.
171.
172.
173.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2217 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973).
Id. at 689-90.
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to purchase housing in Penfield? It was a clear departure from
precedent to require this showing on a motion to dismiss for want
of standing. In Jenkins v. McKeithen,7 1 the Court outlined the
procedure for evaluating such a motion:"'5
[T]he material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. . . . [T]he complaint is to be liberally construed in favor
of plaintiff. . . . The complaint should not be dismissed unless
it appears that appellant could "prove no set of facts in support
of his claim to entitle him relief."
The decision of the Court concerning other parties in the suit
paralleled the pleading requirements applied to the low- and
moderate-income plaintiffs. Petitioner Home Builders, for example, alleged that the zoning ordinance had caused past projects
to fail, and made future projects futile. The Court concluded that
since there was no current project which had been precluded by
the ordinance, the claim was unripe.' Justice Brennan criticized
the Court's position accurately when he stated that the majority
"ignores the thrust of the complaints" that the respondents are
engaged in a "purposeful, conscious scheme to exclude such housing."' 77 The "heart of the complaint" was that "respondents will
not approve any project which will provide residences for low- and
moderate-income people." '7' Justice Brennan's dissent concluded
that to require the existence of a current project would be an
unreasonable prerequisite to standing in this case. Past injury to
the building associations coupled with a future intent to build
should have been sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 7
These factors, in the setting of a challenge to exclusionary zoning
practices, would satisfy the conditions the standing requirement
was designed to assure. 8 '
The overall significance of the principles of analysis applied
in Warth will be determined by future standing cases. The timing
of the inquiry into causation-on the motion to dismiss for lack
of standing-is a departure from past case law. As Justice Brennan pointed out, it provides the Court with a convenient conduit
for dismissing complex cases on standing grounds, cases the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

395 U.S. 411 (1969).
Id. at 421-22, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2214 (1975).
Id. at 2221 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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Court may prefer for other reasons to leave unresolved.' 1 For the
judiciary to dismiss a case such as Warth for lack of standing
leaves unresolved complex and difficult legal issues which were
posed in an adversary context by petitioners who were alleging
concrete injury. Future courts might bear in mind Professor
Jaffe's succinct comments on the judicial process:' 2
Where the citizen is demanding his legally prescribed due in the
form of money, property, or the specific performance of an act
. . .it is a fundamental tenet of our legal system that there
should be a tribunal which will provide a disinterested determination of his claim. Neither the executive nor the legislature is
as dependable as the judiciary in making such determinations

As a result of the Court's decision in Warth, the claims of the
plaintiffs in that case will likely remain without such a disinterested determination.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In 1953, Justice Frankfurter called the concept of standing to
sue a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." ' 3 The recent Supreme Court cases have done nothing to vitiate the soundness of his conclusion, indeed, they have made the doctrine far
more complicated and unpredictable. While it is clear that both
constitutional (article III) and policy considerations enter into the
standing analysis, the Court has failed to satisfactorily differentiate between the two concepts.' 4 In 1962, Professor Lewis stated
the problems he saw with the standing doctrine at that time. His
conclusions are apt today:' 5
181. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2216, 2219-20 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034-35 (1968).
183. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
184. For example, the Court in Schlesinger held that concrete injury was the "indispensable element of a dispute" which "adds the essential dimension of specificity" that
must exist before a federal court will accept jurisdiction. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974). A litigant who is asserting a generalized
grievance has only suffered abstract injury. According to the Schlesinger Court, this is not
sufficient to satisfy the prerequisites of article III.
Id. at 218-19. This construction sharply
contrasts with the Court's position in Warth, where Justice Powell stated that litigants
who assert generalized grievances are barred by a rule of judicial self-governance, and not
necessarily by article I considerations. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975).
185. Lewis, ConstitutionalRights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REv. 433,
453 (1962).
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So long as standing serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various elements of justiciability. . . its convenience alone likely will preclude the Court's adoption of greater
precision in the use of the concept. By the same token, discovering what the Court intends to convey when it relies on the concept will become increasingly difficult.
Justice Brennan echoed this criticism in his opinion in Warth,
chiding the majority for "[refusing] to hear a case on the merits
because they would prefer not to . .
,,.."
Standing focuses on
the individual and whether he has been injured; once a court
looks to the merits of a plaintiff's claim, the standing issue becomes intertwined with other elements of justiciability, such as
whether the plaintiff has raised a political question.'8 7
In Warth, the Court restricted access to the courts by putting
a substantial burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage.' In
the context of a suit challenging exclusionary zoning practices,
the Court made a significant departure from recent law regarding
the purposes of modern pleading.'8 9
The Court's belief that the "countermajoritarian implications of judicial review"'9 should be avoided when a court is
presented with issues having social or political significance was
in evidence in Richardson, in Schlesinger, and in Warth. When a
litigant has asserted a personal injury resulting from an allegedly
illegal action, it is not appropriate to deny an adjudication of his
claim under the rubric of standing. Standing is only one of the
limitations on the judicial power which is derived from article III.
It may be convenient for the courts to use the doctrine to resolve
all of the difficult considerations involved in deciding whether
federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked. Such convenience,
however, does not override the need for clear judicial reasoning
upon which the lower courts and the public rightfully rely.
Ronald Townsend Carman
186. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2216 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11, 179 (1974).
188. See notes 110-14 supra and accompanying text.
189. For contrasting views on the purposes of modem pleading see United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
190. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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